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Abstract
In this paper we propose to extend the separable temporal exponential random graph
model (STERGM) to account for time-varying network- and actor-specific effects. Our
application case is the network of international major conventional weapons transfers,
based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The
application is particularly suitable since it allows to distinguish the potentially differing
driving forces for creating new trade relationships and for the endurance of existing
ones. In accordance with political economy models we expect security- and network-
related covariates to be most important for the formation of transfers, whereas repeated
transfers should prevalently be determined by the receivers’ market size and military
spending. Our proposed modelling approach corroborates the hypothesis and quantifies
the corresponding effects. Additionally, we subject the time-varying heterogeneity
effects to a functional principal component analysis. This serves as exploratory tool
and allows to identify countries that stand out by exceptional increases or decreases of
their tendency to import and export weapons.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present a data-driven extension of the separable temporal exponential ran-
dom graph model (STERGM, Krivitsky and Handcock 2014) applied appropriately to a
highly relevant case: The international weapons exchange. The STERGM allows to differen-
tiate between the formation, i.e. new arms trades, and the persistence of existing edges, i.e.
continued arms transfers. To introduce into the field, we first sketch and motivate network
analysis for (arms) trade data. We then put the model in a broader context of statistical
network models, supplemented by a description and discussion of international arms trade.
Trade networks
Statistical network analysis provides a good framework to conceptualize international trade
systems. Schweitzer et al. (2009) highlight the enormous interdependencies of economic
transactions and propose a network approach for capturing the systemic complexity. Grav-
ity models, as standard approach in econometrics for modelling trade data (Head and Mayer
2014), are usually focussed on dyadic relations. Hence, the models exclude highly impor-
tant hyper-dyadic dependencies, and especially indirect relations. Squartini et al. (2011a,b)
showed that gravity models of international trade are, therefore, necessarily incomplete. In
particular, they demonstrated that analysing the determinants of link creation is highly
important as the binary network carries information that goes beyond the classical grav-
ity model representation. Barigozzi et al. (2010) demonstrated that trade networks are
commodity-specific, i.e. their topologies are quite different across commodities - leading us
to conclude that there is also a need to consider arms transfers separately. This is theo-
retically challenging since arms transfers constitute a very special trade relationship. The
transferred products and services can potentially lead to deadly quarrels between or within
states, or they may contribute to stabilization and deterrence. The delivery is not always a
purely economic exchange but may also serve the support of aligned countries or groups. In
sum, the exchange of weapons is a politically sensible and security-related, but also an eco-
nomically beneficial relationship. For this reason, we make use of flexible statistical models
for network data that allow us to investigate the special incentives in the international arms
trade network.
Statistical network models
Statistical models that are suitable for temporal networks have been developed just in the
recent years, and different techniques have been proposed. Robins and Pattison (2001)
were the first to extend the static exponential random graph model (ERGM, Holland and
Leinhardt 1981; Lusher et al. 2012) to discrete-time Markov chain models, see also Snijders
et al. (2010). Hanneke et al. (2010) or Leifeld et al. (2018) also consider network dynamics
on a discrete time scale. They propose the temporal exponential random graph model
(TERGM) which makes use of a Markov structure conditioning on previous network statistics
as covariates in the model. A related approach is presented by Almquist and Butts (2014),
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discussing assumptions that allow for circumventing the often computationally intractable
fitting process of dynamic network models by applying logistic regression models. Koskinen
et al. (2015) expand the model using Bayesian methods which allows the parameters in the
dynamic network model to change with time. A general perspective on dynamic networks
is provided by Holme (2015). It also includes models for continuous time, such as stochastic
actor-oriented models (SAOM, see Snijders et al. 2010) or dynamic stochastic block models
(SBM, see for instance Xu 2015).
A recent novel modelling strategy for networks observed at discrete time points has been
proposed by Krivitsky and Handcock (2014). They do not model the state of the network
itself but rather focus on network changes which either occur because of the formation of new
edges or because of the (non-)persistence of existing ones. Assuming independence between
the two processes, conditional on the previous network, leads to the so called separable
TERGM. The separation is motivated by the fact that the two processes under study are
highly likely to be driven by different mechanisms and factors. The authors argue that the
inclusion of a stability term (being mathematically equivalent to the inclusion of the lagged
edge values as explanatory variable) in a TERGM could lead to ambiguous conclusions
because it is not clear whether a positive stability parameter means that non-existing ties
remain non-existent (no formation) or whether existent ties remain existent (persistence).
For many real world dynamic networks the process change with time and therefore the
assumption of stationarity seems to be inappropriate. This is especially the case for network
data that span a long time period and potentially subject to structural breaks. Under such
conditions it appears necessary to allow the model parameters to change with time. We
take up this idea and extend the STERGM by allowing for time-varying coefficients. More
specifically, we propose to rely on so called generalized additive models (GAM). This model
class has been proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1987) and extended fundamentally by
Wood (2017) to allow for smooth, semi-parametric modelling of time-varying parameters in
a generalized regression framework (see also Ruppert et al. 2009).
Furthermore, the assumption of node homogeneity must be regarded as questionable. We
therefore allow for heterogeneity in the model (see Thiemichen et al. 2016 for a discussion
on node heterogeneity). Accordingly, we follow the p2-model developed by Duijn et al.
(2004) and enrich the STERGM with functional time-varying random effects (Durba´n et al.
2005) which leads to smooth node-specific effects. We propose to investigate the fitted
functional heterogeneity effects with techniques from functional data analysis (FDA), see for
instance Ramsay and Silverman (2005). This allows to identify countries (nodes) that have
fundamentally changed their role in the arms-trading network over the observation period.
Global weapons transfers
At present, there are only a few empirical binary network analyses of the international arms
trade. Akerman and Seim (2014) pioneered in analysing topological features of the binary
arms trade network. Their descriptive network analysis is supplemented by an empirical
investigation using a binarized gravity model without considering network dependencies. In
3
this article we build on the recently published paper by Thurner et al. (2018) that uses a
TERGM. However, our approach extends the TERGM in many aspects. Most importantly,
we treat dynamic dependencies in a fundamentally different way. In Thurner et al. (2018), the
authors found that previous arms trading has a highly determining impact on the occurrence
of subsequent transfers due to the enormous inertia. This finding implies that the information
whether trade happened in the preceding time period(s) has a considerable impact on the
probability to trade again, leading to the same ambiguities as mentioned in the stability term
example by Krivitsky and Handcock (2014). In order to disentangle the driving network
formation forces due to pure inertia, we propose to incorporate this distinction directly in
the model. More precisely, the STERGM allows us to investigate whether the mechanisms
that result in transfers being formed without immediate predecessor differ from those that
lead to consecutive transfers. This is also of practical importance because governments
carefully reflect the decision whether to authorize arms transfers based on economic and
security considerations. Furthermore, they continuously reconsider this decision whether
to maintain such trade relations or whether to dissolve because the importer potentially
jeopardises strategic interests or violates once shared normative standards (see Garcia-Alonso
and Levine 2007 for the general model and for Blanton 2005 as well as Erickson 2015 for
normative considerations).
We expect several necessary conditions to hold for the formation of transfers: the receiving
country must be considered at least marginally trustworthy and politically and economically
reliable. Hence, passing a threshold of trustworthiness is required for formation, i.e building
new trades. The special role of trustworthiness in arms transfers stems from the fact that
security concerns play an important role when governments decide whether to license the
delivery. We expect network statistics, as well as regime dissimilarity and formal alliances
to play a prominent role in the formation stage to raise a relationship above the minimum
threshold level of reservation. Follow-up trades and their repetition should then be rather
dominated by economic considerations like the size of a receiver economy and by the size of
the military expenditures (see Schulze et al. 2017).
While differentiation between formation and repetition, respectively, legitimates the use
of the STERGM per se, our extensions of the model towards time-varying coefficients are
important and in our view inevitable because the observational time covers more than 65
years. Hence, the introduction of smooth dynamic effects is needed to build a realistic model.
Given the dynamic evolution of the network, the historical developments and the presence
of at least one system-wide structural break with the collapse of the Soviet Union, we expect
that the generative mechanisms change over time and differ with respect to the included
variables if we compare the pre- and post cold war time period (see also Akerman and Seim
2014 and Thurner et al. 2018).
Finally, we argue that not all network activities and trades can be explained by ob-
servables and, thus, unobserved heterogeneity remains. We expect primarily actor-specific
heterogeneity which is accentuated by systematic historical accounts (Harkavy 1975; Krause
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Figure 1: Degree distributions of the included countries for the outdegree (number of out-
going edges) on the left and indegree (number of ingoing edges) on the right. Averages over
all years are represented by the solid line. The whiskers in grey show the minimum and
maximum Values realized in all years. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.
1995). This highlights the self-reinforcing tendencies of technological advantages of highly
developed countries which results in strong heterogeneity of the countries’ abilities to export
(and import). Therefore, the inclusion of actor-specific random effects seems necessary and
we expect strong heterogeneity among the countries with respect to imports and exports.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the data provided by the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Section 3 introduces the statistical models used to
analyse the data. Section 4 provides the results and their interpretation. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Data description and preprocessing
Data on the international trade of major conventional weapons (MCW) are provided by
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see SIPRI 2017a). They include for
example aircrafts, armoured vehicles and ships (see Table 1 in the Appendix A.1 for an
overview of the types of arms). The countries included and their three-digit country codes
are given in Table 2 of Appendix A.1. Note that we have excluded all non-state organizations
like the Khmer Rouge or the Lebanon Palestinian Rebels from the dataset as well as countries
with no reliable covariate information available.
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Figure 2: Share of subsequent arms transfers (left) and cumulative share of subsequent
arms transfers (right). Number of subsequent transfers on the horizontal axis and share of
observations on the vertical axis.
Figure 9 in the Appendix A.1 shows binary networks for the years 2015 and 2016 and
Figure 10 in the Appendix A.1 provides a collection of summary statistics for the networks.
We focus on the binary occurrence of trade thereby disregarding the exact transfer vol-
umes and follow Akerman and Seim (2014) and Thurner et al. (2018) in setting the edge
value to one if there is a trade flow greater zero between two countries and zero else. Addi-
tionally, we re-estimated our model with different thresholds and found that the results are
quite robust, for details see the Supplementary Material.
The analysis of the degree distributions is of vital interest in statistical network analysis
(Baraba´si and Albert 1999) and gives important insights into the basic properties of the
network under study. With more than 65 networks to analyse, we compute the period-
average degree distribution and provide information on the minimal and maximal value of
the realized degree distribution. This is represented in a log-log version in Figure 1 for both,
outdegree and indegree. The plot shows the enormous heterogeneity in the networks. Most of
the countries have no exports at all with a time-average share of 78% of countries exhibiting
outdegree zero, while the outdegree distribution has a long tail, indicating that there are a
few countries, having a very high outdegree. The highest observed outdegree in a year is 66
and is observed for the United States. Other countries with exceptional high outdegree for
almost the whole time period are Russia (Soviet Union), France, Germany, United Kingdom,
China, Italy and Canada. In the right plot, the indegree distribution can be seen. Here the
pattern is different. The highest value observed in a year is 16 and corresponds to Saudi
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Arabia. In contrast to the outdegree distribution, the countries with a high indegree are
changing with time. In the beginning of the observational period the countries with the
highest indegree were Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Turkey and Australia, but in more recent
times these are the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and Oman.
In Figure 2 we provide a graphical representation of the change and stability patterns
in the network. On the left hand side we present the share of observations (vertical axis)
against the number of subsequent transfers (i.e. repeated transfers) on the horizontal axis.
Out of roughly 19, 000 recorded trading instances only 33% do not have at least one consec-
utive transfer in the follow-up year of a trade. Looking on the right hand side of Figure 2
we visualize the share of observations (vertical axis) that has at least as much subsequent
transfers as indicated by the horizontal axis. It can be seen that roughly the same share of
observations (35%) lasts at least five periods and almost 10% of all dyadic relations last more
than 20 consecutive years without any interruption. Therefore, a differentiated approach to
the explanation of formation and persistence could be fruitful in this application case.
3. Model
3.1. Dynamic formation and Persistence model
In this section we formalize our network model. Let Y t be the network at time point t, which
consists of a set of actors, labelled as At and a set of directed edges, represented through the
index set Et = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ At}. Note that this is a slight misuse of index notation since
Y tij does not necessarily refer to the (i, j)-th element if we consider Y
t as adjacency matrix.
This is because the actor set At is allowed to change with time, so that i and j are not
running indices from 1 to nt, where nt is the number of elements in A
t. Instead indices i and
j represent the i-th and j-th country, respectively. We define Y tij = 1 if country i exports
weapons to country j and since self-loops are meaningless, elements Y tii are not defined.
We aim to model the network in t based on the previous year network in t− 1. To do so
we have to take into account that the actor sets At−1 and At may differ. In particular we have
to consider the case of newly formed countries. New countries of interest are those that are
present in t but do not provide information about their network embedding in the previous
period. For exports this is not a concern as it is almost never the case that a new country
starts sending arms immediately after entering the network. Notable exceptions are Russia,
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, these countries have clear defined predecessor
states (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) which can be used in order to gain information
about the position of these countries in the precedent network. Regarding the imports,
there is a share of countries that start receiving arms immediately with entering the network.
Notwithstanding, those transactions represent a share of less then 0.3% of the observed trade
flows. Therefore, we regard this cases as negligible and include in the model only countries
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where information on the current and previous time period is available. We formalize this
approach by defining Y t,t−1 as the subgraph of Y t with actor set Bt,t−1 = At∩At−1 containing
nt,t−1 := |Bt,t−1| elements. Accordingly, Y t−1,t represents the subgraph of Y t−1 with actor
set Bt,t−1. Note that both subgraphs share the same set of actors and Y t−1 = Y t−1,t if At−1
and At coincide.
From a modelling perspective, we follow Hanneke et al. (2010) and assume that the
network in t can be modelled given preceding networks, using a first-order Markov structure
to describe transition dynamics for those actors included in the set Bt,t−1. Furthermore, we
want to identify the driving forces of a transfer in t if there was a preceding transfer in t− 1
in the persistence model while the formation model considers the process of forming a trade
relationship without a preceding transfer, i.e. biannual data. The notion of formation and
persistence can be amended by using broader time windows. We demonstrate the robustness
of our results with respect to broader time windows in the Supplementary Material.
Let Y + = Y t,t−1 ∪ Y t−1,t represent the formation network, that consists of edges that are
either present in t or in t− 1. For the persistence network, we define Y − = Y t,t−1 ∩ Y t−1,t,
being the network that consists of edges that are present in t and in t − 1. Based on the
actor set Bt,t−1 and given the formation and persistence network as well as the network in
t− 1 the network in t is uniquely defined by
Y t,t−1 = Y +\(Y t−1,t\Y −) = Y − ∪ (Y +\Y t−1,t). (1)
Note that both, Y + as well as Y − depend on time t as well, which we omitted in the notation
for ease of readability. We assume that for each discrete time step, the processes of formation
and persistence are separable. That is, the process that drives the formation of edges does
not interact with the process of the persistence of the edges conditional on the previous
network. Formally this is given by the conditional independence of Y + and Y −:
P (Y t,t−1 = yt,t−1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ) =
P (Y + = y+|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+)P (Y − = y−|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ−),
where the lower case letters denote the realizations of the random networks and θ = (θ+, θ−)
gives the parameters of the model. We will also include non-network related covariates in
our analysis, but we suppress this here in the notation for simplicity.
Note that it is not possible to use the lagged response as predictor, as by construction
Y t−1,tij = 1⇒ Y +ij = 1 and Y t−1,tij = 0⇒ Y −ij = 0. That is, an edge that existed in t−1 cannot
be formed newly and an edge that was not existent in t− 1 cannot be dissolved. It follows
that the formation model exclusively focuses on the binary variables Y +ij with (i, j) ∈ E+ =
{(i, j) : i, j ∈ Bt,t−1, Y t−1,tij = 0}. This assures that in t − 1 no edge between actors i and j
was present and both actors are observable at both time points. Equivalently, the model for
Y − consists of observations Y −ij with (i, j) ∈ E− = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ Bt,t−1, Y t−1,tij = 1}, assuring
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that only edges that could potentially persist enter the model. The time-dependence of E+
and E− is omitted for ease of readability.
If we use an ERGM for the transition, this would yield the following probability model
for the formation
P (Y + = y+|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+) = exp{θ
+g(y+, yt−1,t)}∑
y˜+∈Y+(yt−1,t) exp{θ+g(y˜+, yt−1,t)}
.
The sum in the denominator is over all possible formation networks from the set of potential
edges that can form given the network yt−1,t. The inner product θ+g(y+, yt−1), relates a
vector of statistics g(·) to the parameter vector θ+. The analogous model is assumed for the
persistence of edges and not explicitly given here for the interest of space.
We will subsequently work with a simplified model which is computationally much more
tractable. We assume that the formation or persistence of an edge at time point t does solely
depend on the past state but not on the current state of the network. This is achieved by
restricting the statistics such, that they decompose to
g(y+, yt−1,t) =
∑
(i,j)∈E+
y+ij g˜ij(y
t−1,t)
for some statistics g˜(·). This assumption is extensively discussed by Almquist and Butts
(2014) and can be well justified by the notion that the lagged network accounts for the
major share of the dependency among the edges in the current network. It also allows for
intuitive interpretations as can be seen as follows. Let Y +−ij represent the formation network
Y +, excluding the entry Y +ij . Then, for (i, j) ∈ E+ the following logistic model holds
log
{
P (Y +ij = 1|Y +−ij = y+−ij, Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+)
P (Y +ij = 0|Y +−ij = y+−ij, Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+)
}
= log
{
P (Y +ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+)
P (Y +ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t; θ+)
}
= θ+g˜ij(y
t−1,t).
(2)
Note that model (2) describes network dynamics, but the model itself is static. Hence we
model dynamics but do not allow for dynamics in the model itself. This is a very implausible
restriction which we give up by allowing the model parameters to change with time t, that
is we replace the parameter θ+ by θ+(t), representing a smooth function in time. In other
words, we allow the parameters in the model to smoothly interact with time. This leads to
a time-varying coefficient model in the style as proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1993).
The focus of interest is therefore not only on the formation and persistence of edges (trade
flows) but also on how these effects change in the 67 years long observation period.
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3.2. Network statistics and explanatory variables
From a statistical point of view, network statistics are required in order to capture network
dependencies. However, as social network literature has shown, network statistics usually
are not just statistical controls but convey substantial meaning (see e.g. Snijders 2011). In
the given context, they can be motivated by political, strategic and economic arguments
that refer to real-world processes (see Thurner et al. 2018). Note, that we norm all network
statistics (with the exception of Reciprocity) to be within a percentage range between 0 and
100, this is necessary in order to make the statistics independent from the varying network
size and allows to compare them.
Outdegree: The outdegree of a node is a standard statistic in network models. Formally, the
outdegree of actor i at time point t− 1 is defined as
outdegt−1,i =
100
nt,t−1 − 1
∑
k∈Bt,t−1
yt−1,tik .
The arms trade network exhibits a highly oligopolistic structure with a few high-intensity
traders, hence a positive coefficient for the outdegree of the sender (sender.outdegt−1,i) is
plausible. However, we incorporate country-specific random effects in the model and it is
therefore not clear whether the senders’ outdegree as a global measure is still of relevance
once controlled for the random country heterogeneity.
Only few advanced countries within NATO export and import at the same time. They
have a highly differentiated portfolio, rendering specialization economically reasonable and
strategically non-hazardous. In order to better represent this world-wide asymmetry we
include the outdegree of the importer (receiver.outdegt−1,j). This should not be captured
by the random effects and we expect a clear negative effect, indicating that strong exporters
seldom match with strong importers.
Reciprocity: This statistic is intended to detect whether there is a general tendency of arms
transfers to be mutual. The statistic measures whether the potential receiver was a sender
in the dyadic relationship in the previous period:
recipt−1,ij = y
t−1,t
ji .
Reciprocation is an essential mechanism in human relations in general, and in trade more
specifically. Similar as noted above, in the context of arms transfers, especially highly de-
veloped countries exhibit this feature. Since this group of countries is rather small, and
specialization-induced transfers between developed countries do not lead to continuous in-
flows we expect this mechanism to be rather visible at the formation stage, whereas it should
not be a dominant feature for permanent repetition.
Transitivity: Hyperdyadic trade relationships are an effective mechanism for pooling risks
in buyer-seller networks (Bramoull et al. 2019) and for the emergence of generalized trust
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which is especially important in exchanging security goods. As a measure for higher-order
dependencies we include transitivity, defined as
transt−1,ij =
100
nt,t−1 − 2
∑
k∈Bt,t−1,k 6=i,j
yt−1,tik y
t−1,t
kj .
This statistic essentially counts the directed two-paths from i to j in t − 1 and can be
interpreted as a direct application of the Friend of a Friend logic from social networks to arms
trade. Clearly, this kind of network embeddedness of weapons transfer deals is important
for establishing for new ones but is also likely to be relevant for the continuation of already
existing ones.
Shared Suppliers: We also include a statistic that we call shared-suppliers in this context.
This statistic counts the shared number of actors that export to a given pair of countries:
supt−1,ij =
100
nt,t−1 − 2
∑
k∈Bt,t−1,k 6=i,j
yt−1,tki y
t−1,t
kj .
This statistic allows to investigate whether two countries that share multiple suppliers have
the tendency to engage in trade with each other. Such a pattern is likely to be induced
by a general hierarchy in the network (see Krause 1995). While the first tier consists of
strong exporters, the second tier is populated by countries with the ability to produce and
export that are nevertheless mainly supplied by the big exporters. Countries with many
shared partners are likely to engage in trade with each other but on the other hand they
are typically dependent on imports from the first tier. Therefore, relationships among those
countries are rather of a sporadic nature and unlikely to endure. Consequently, we expect a
positive coefficient in the formation model and a negative one in the persistence model.
Naturally, the network of international arms trade is not exclusively driven by endogenous
network processes but also influenced by variables from the realms of politics and economics.
We lag all exogenous covariates by one year, first in order to be consistent with the idea that
the determination of the network in t is based on the preceding time period and second, to
account for the time lag between the ordering and the delivery of MCW.
Formal Alliance: We regard dyadic formal alliances (including defence agreements and non-
aggression pacts) as an important security related criteria that plays a central role for the
formation during the cold war period. Therefore, the binary variable allianceij is included
in the model, being one if countries i and j had a formal alliance in the previous period.
Given the restriction that the data is available only until 2012 (Correlates of War Project
2017a) we extrapolate the data, thereby assuming that the formal alliances did not change
between 2012 and 2015.
Regime Dissimilarity: Another important security related variable that potentially acts on
the formation of arms transfers is given by the differences in political regimes between two
11
potential trading partners. Hence we include the so called polity IV score, ranging from the
spectrum −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). This data can be
downloaded as annual cross-national time-series until 2015, see Center for systemic Peace
(2017) for the data and Marshall (2017) as a basic reference. In our model we operationalise
the distance between political regimes by using the absolute differences between the scores:
poldiffij = |polityi − polityj|.
GDP: Following the standard gravity model, we include market sizes and distance in our
model. The standard measure for market size is the gross domestic product (GDP, in mil-
lions). We include the GDP in logarithmic form for the sender (gdpi) as well as the receiver
(gdpj). The GDP data are taken from Gleditsch (2013b) and merged from the year 2010
on with recent real GDP data from the World Bank real GDP dataset (World Bank 2017).
Clearly, the market size and economic reliability of the exporter is a prerequisite for forming
and maintaining arms exports.
Distance: For gravity models applied to trade in commercial goods, there exists mounting
empirical evidence that distance is a relevant factor for determining trade relations (Disdier
and Head 2008). We do not expect that trade costs and geographical distance impede arms
trade because arms transfers establish world-wide alignments of exporters pursuing global
strategic interests. Nevertheless, we include the logarithmic distance between capital cities
in kilometres (Gleditsch 2013a) in order to fulfil the gravity model specification.
Military Expenditures: We propose to include military expenditures of the sending and re-
ceiving country. This measure can be used as representing the size of the defence industrial
base of the exporter, and the spending power and the intensity of the threat perceptions
of the importing country. Accordingly, military expenditure is added separately for the ex-
porter and the importer in logarithmic form (milexi, milexj). With regard to the distinction
between formation and persistence, our expectation is related to the hypothesis that coun-
tries with high military expenditures are attractive customers for repeated importing. We
therefore expect a positive and high coefficient for the military expenditures of the importer
in the persistence model. The data are available from Correlates of War Project (2017b) in
the national material capabilities data set with Singer et al. (1972) as the basic reference on
the data.
3.3. Modelling heterogeneity
The proposed network model assumes homogeneity, meaning that all differences between
nodes in the network are fully described by the gravity model, enriched by security re-
lated criteria and network statistics as proposed above. However, the arms transfer network
exhibits a rather small number of countries that are high-intensity exporters and a large
number of countries that are restricted to imports. Furthermore, there are some countries
that change their relative position in the trade network during the course of time. This
mirrors a substantial amount of dynamic heterogeneity which need to be taken into account.
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This dynamic heterogeneity is accommodated by the inclusion of latent country effects,
capturing the unobserved heterogeneity. We to follow the idea of Durba´n et al. (2005) and
model country specific random curves which are fitted with penalized splines. This can be
written in a mixed model representation such that the smooth country-specific effects are
constructed using a B-spline basis with (a-priori) normally distributed spline coefficients.
We follow the modelling strategy of Durban and Aguilera-Morillo (2017) and assume that
the model includes two time-dependent random coefficients φ+i,sender(t) and φ
+
j,receiver(t). The
effects are assumed to be a realization of a stochastic process with continuous and integrable
functions. For each sender and receiver in both models the country-specific curves are given
by
φi(t) = B(t)ai (3)
where B(t) = (B1(t), ..., BQ(t)) is a B-spline basis covering the time range of observations
and ai = (ai1, ..., aiQ) is the coefficient vector. We impose the prior distribution
ai ∼ N(0, σ2aDQ), i.i.d. for i = 1, ..., n
where DQ is the inverse of a difference based penalty matrix which guarantees smoothness
of the fitted curves φi(t) (see e.g. Eilers and Marx 1996, for details on smoothing with
B-splines). Note that for time windows where a country did not exist, the corresponding
B-spline does take value zero, so that no heterogeneity effect is present.
3.4. Complete model and estimation
Putting all the above elements together, the specification of the formation model of equation
(2) is given by
θ+(t)g˜ij(y
t−1,t, xt−1,tij ) =θ
+
0 sender.outdegt−1,iθ
+
1 (t) + receiver.outdegt−1,jθ
+
2 (t)
+ recipt−1,ijθ+3 (t) + transt−1,ijθ
+
4 (t) + supt−1,ijθ
+
5 (t)
+ distancet−1,ijθ+5 (t) + alliancet−1,ijθ
+
6 (t) + poldifft−1,ijθ
+
7 (t)
+ gdpt−1,iθ+8 (t) + gdpt−1,jθ
+
9 (t) +milext−1,iθ
+
10(t) +milext−1,jθ
+
11(t)
+ φ+i,sender(t) + φ
+
j,receiver(t).
Analogously we get the persistence model. Estimation is carried out with spline smoothing.
That is, we replace the coefficients by
θk(t) = B(t)uk,
where uk is penalized through
uk ∼ N(0, σ2D).
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Like above, the penalty matrix is appropriately chosen (see e.g. Wood 2017) and B(t) is a
B-spline basis. Hence, smooth functions and smooth random heterogeneity can be estimated
in a coherent framework (see Durba´n et al. 2005). The entire model can be integrated in
the flexible generalized additive model (GAM) framework provided by Wood (2017) (see also
Wood 2006) which is implemented in the mgcv package (version 1.8-28) by Wood (2011). The
identification of the smooth components and the intercept term is ensured by a ”sum-to-zero”
constraint (Wood 2017). For further details see the Appendix A.2.
4. Results
4.1. Time-varying fixed effects
The results of the time-varying effects are grouped into network-related covariates (presented
in Figure 3) and political and economic covariates (presented in Figure 4). The left columns
give the coefficients for the formation model and the right columns for the persistence model,
respectively. In the case of the network statistics, a schematic representation of the corre-
sponding network effects is added on the right hand side. The values for the coefficients
are presented as solid lines with shaded regions, indicating two standard error bounds. The
zero-line is indicated as dashed line and the estimates for time-constant coefficients are given
by the dotted horizontal line. Note that the coefficients at a given time point can be inter-
preted just as the coefficients in a simple logit model. Additionally, for the same coefficient
(or coefficients with the same norming) in the formation and persistence model, the effect
size can be compared directly.
Network-Effects (see Figure 3)
Outdegree: The senders’ outdegree has a coefficient that is almost time-constant and close
to zero for both models. This stands in contrast to the findings of Thurner et al. (2018),
where a strong effect is present. Hence, once controlled for country-specific heterogeneity
(especially the sender-specific country effect), no population-level outdegree effect for the
exporter is present (we show in the Supplementary Material that the effect is indeed present
when country-specific heterogeneity is excluded).
However, the inclusion of country-specific sender and receiver effects does not affect the
effect of the receivers’ outdegree and the coefficient is consistently negative, and slightly
increasing over time in the formation model. For the persistence model, we find a less pro-
nounced but significant negative effect. We interpret this as clear evidence that countries
with a high outdegree are comparatively less frequently importing, and importers usually
have relatively less frequent export relations. According to our experience this specification
captures the trade asymmetries of the oligopolistic market better than just specifying the
indegrees of the receiver.
Reciprocity: Controlling for the distinguished asymmetrical nature of the weapons transfers,
14
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Figure 3: Time-varying coefficients of network statistics in solid black. Shaded areas give
two standard error bounds. Time-constant effects in dashed grey and zero line in dotted
black. Schematic representation of the network effects on the right hand side.
we identify a positive and significant impact of reciprocity in the formation model. Reci-
procity in repeated transfers is only a relevant feature after the breakdown of the bipolar
block structure. We conclude that the asymmetric structure is more present in persistent
trade relations with importing countries that are typically dependent on big exporters.
Transitivity: Looking at three-node statistics it can be seen that the variable transitivity
has a positive impact on the formation and persistence. In the formation model, the effect is
insignificant in the first years. This may be influenced by the clear hegemony of the United
States and the Soviet Union, respectively, immediately after World War II which did not
require a shared control over the recipient country, because the donor was powerful enough
to secure the terms of a deal. In the 1980s middle power countries became technologically
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more advanced and especially in the West, they joined the US in delivering to other coun-
tries. The pronounced change between 1990 and 2010 can be explained by the break up of
the two hostile blocs and the interruption of long-standing arm-trading partnerships leading
to a fundamental reorganization until 2010 when the effect came back to the level of 1990.
Although these arguments are also valid for the persistence model, we see that transitivity is
less relevant for ongoing, repeated transfers (the time constant effect in the formation model
has twice the size as the one in the persistence model). This impression is also strengthened
by the fact that the coefficient is not subject to changes over time.
Shared Suppliers: The coefficients related to the shared suppliers corroborate our expecta-
tion that many shared suppliers lead to the formation of transfers (positive and significant
coefficient for the whole time period in the formation model). This indeed mirrors the phe-
nomenon described above: there is a hierarchy of producing countries in the world. Receiver
countries i and j should become acquainted with these technologies and should have similar
levels of production capacities. This allows them to exchange arms. Also, the act of receiving
both from the same supplier means that this country places trust to both receivers - such
that this facilitates trust giving one to another. On the other hand, in the persistence model,
the effect is indeed significantly negative and virtually zero from the 1975 on, showing that
repetitive trading is not promoted by many shared suppliers.
Covariate Effects (see Figure 4)
Formal Alliance: The impact of a bilateral formal alliances on the formation of a transfer
is positive and significant for both, the formation and with a more modest effect for the
persistence, corroborating our expectation that formal alliances are most relevant for the
formation, i.e. by passing the required threshold of starting weapons transfers. The required
threshold of trustfulness to start seems to decline over time for the initiation. Hence, while
formal alliances play a central role for arms trading after the second world war, the forma-
tion of arms trades is less and less influenced by the existence of a formal alliance by the
sending and receiving state. However, given there exists an alliance, the impact (despite
being smaller) continues to be relevant for repeated transfers. This is an important insight
as we show for the first time that formalized alliance actually breed a dense web of arms
transfers.
Regime Dissimilarity: For the formation model, the coefficient on the absolute difference of
the polity scores is all along negative, significant and shows some time variation. With the
decay of the eastern bloc, the resistance to send new arms to dissimilar regimes increases
until 2000. After that, the absolute effect of different polity scores declines again, coming
back to the long-term constant effect. Interestingly, we find that regime dissimilarity is irrel-
evant in the persistence model, showing that given a relationship is started, repetition does
no more require regimes to exhibit shared governance values.
GDP: As expected, the coefficients on the logarithmic GDP for sender and receiver are
positive and constant for both models. However, the effect for the senders’ GDP is much
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stronger in the formation model, showing that indeed mostly economically strong countries
are able to open new markets for arms exports. Together, the coefficients support the ”grav-
ity hypothesis”, i.e. greater economic power and market sizes of the sender as well as the
receiver increases the probability of forming and maintaining trade relations. However, given
a transfer relation is started, this effect becomes smaller for repetition.
Distance: In accordance with previous insights (Thurner et al. 2018), the results on the
logarithmic distance contradicts the standard gravity model and distance proves to be in-
significant in both models.
Military Expenditures: For the military expenditures of the sender, we find very comparable
and declining effects that become insignificant from 1990 on in both models. This indicates
that with the end of the cold war the dominance of exporting countries with high military
budgets has decreased. For the receivers’ military expenditures in the formation model, the
effect is positive and turns significant with time. This clearly illustrates that the military
expenditures of the receiver are not as important in the Cold War period where super powers
often granted military assistance. Only with end of the 1980s there begins a marketization
of the weapons transfers with suppliers demanding money for delivery. Given there is a pre-
ceding exchange, we find a very strong effect for the military expenditures of the receiver for
the full observational period, indicating that the availability of huge military expenditures
is a key for understanding the continuous yearly inflow of weapons.
Overall, the results confirm our initial hypothesis. Judged by the size of the coefficients
and their significance we find that the network statistics (reciprocity, transitivity, shared
suppliers) and security related covariates (formal alliance, regime dissimilarity) prove to be
highly influential in the formation model. On the other hand, we find weaker (or insignificant)
network effects in the persistence model combined with a high dominance of the GDP and
especially the military expenditures of the receiving country. This is not to say that we
regard for example the positive effect of transitivity or alliances in the persistence model
as irrelevant for repeated trading since the special nature of arms trading clearly demands
trust for the formation and the persistence of transfers but the effects nevertheless show
that the two processes are guided by different mechanisms that attach different priorities to
security-related and economic variables.
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Figure 4: Time-varying coefficients of political and economic covariates in solid black. Shaded
areas give two standard error bounds. Time-constant effects in dashed grey and zero line in
dotted black. 18
4.2. Time-varying smooth random effects
4.2.1. Functional component analysis
We now pay attention to the actor-specific heterogeneity. In Figure 5, the country-specific
effects for the sender, as well as the receiver countries are visualized for the formation model
on the left and the persistence model on the right. Note that in these plot we have truncated
the curves for the years where countries are not existent.
At a first sight, interpretation of these plots looks clumsy. We therefore retrieve informa-
tion by employing a functional principal component analysis to the multivariate time series
of random effects seen in Figure 5 (see also Ramsay and Silverman 2005 and the Appendix
A.3). The results are shown in Figure 6 for the formation model and in Figure 7 for the
persistence model. On the left hand side the scores of the first two principal components
are plotted, where the latter are visualized on the right hand side. The share of variance
explained by the respective component is provided in the brackets. The basic idea of the
approach is to show the effect of the principal components as perturbations from the mean
random effects curves. By adding (the ”+” line) or subtracting (the ”-” line) a multiple of
the principal component curve we get the visualized perturbation from the mean.
The first principal component is close to be constant and represents the share of variance
induced by different overall levels of the random effect curves. The dynamic of the random
effects is captured by the second principal component, delivering a tendency for an upward
movement if positive and downward if negative. Hence, looking on the horizontal axes, we
see countries that build up their arm trade links over the years as exporters (importers) on
the right hand side while countries that are reluctant to building up export (import) links
are plotted on the left hand side. Looking on the vertical axes, we see countries that decrease
their role as exporter (importer) over the time on the bottom, and vice versa countries that
increase the number of export (import) links over time on the top. All these effects are
conditional on the remaining covariate effects discussed before. Hence, these random effects
capture the remaining heterogeneity not included in the remaining model.
4.2.2. Results of the functional component analysis
Because of the great amount of information condensed in Figures 6 and 7 we restrict our
interpretation to a few global patterns and selected countries that take either very special
positions in the arms trade network (high or low values for component 1) or exhibit variation
over time (high or low values for component 2). Overall regarding the different levels of the
random effects, it can already be seen in Figure 5, that the heterogeneity is much more pro-
nounced in the formation model in comparison to the persistence model. Furthermore, in the
formation model, the countries differ more strongly in their ability to export in comparison
to their ability to import while this contrast is not present in the persistence model.
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Figure 5: Fitted time-varying smooth random effects φ(t) plotted against time with country
codes. The respective models are in the columns (formation on the left and persistence on
the right) and the type of random effects in the rows (sender effect on the top and receiver
effect on the bottom).
A global pattern regarding the dynamics of the sender effect becomes visible since the top
left in Figure 6 looks like a lying mushroom. That is, countries that started on a low level
(i.e. negative component 1) show, with the exception of Japan (JPN) and Turkey (TUR),
not very much upward or downward variability (i.e. low level for component 2). In contrast,
countries that have a random effect above zero move more strongly up or down with time.
20
−40 −20 0 20 40−
20
−
15
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
15
Formation: Component Score, Sender
Component 1
Co
m
po
ne
nt
 2
AFGALB
DZA
AGO
ARG
ARM AUS
AUT
AZEBHRBGD
BLRBEL
BENBTNBOL
BIHBWABRA
BGR
FABDIKHMC R
CAN
CPVCAF
TCD
CHL
CHN
COL OMCOGCRICIVHRVCUBCYP CZR
CZE
DNK
JIDOM
ZAR
ECU
EGY
SLVNQ ERIESTETHFJI
FIN
FRA
GAB MB GEO
GDR
DEU
GHA
GRC
GT GIN GNUYHTIHND
HUN
IND
IDN
IRN
IRQ
IRL
ISRITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KWT
KGZ
LAOLVA
LBN
LSBR
LBY
LTLUXMKDM GWI
MYS
MLITU
MEX MDA
N
MAR
OZMMR NANP
NLDNZLNIC
N RNGA
PRK
NOR
OMN
PAK
PA PY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
QAT
R M RUS
WSAUSE
SR
E
SGP
SVKS N
SO
ZAF
KORSVN
YEM
SUN
ESP
LK
DN
SUWZ
SWECHE
SYRTWN
TJKTZA
THA
MPT OTTTUN
TUR
TKMUG
UKR
ARE
GBR
USA
URY
UZB
VEN
V YE
YUG
Z ZWE 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
PC 1 (95%)
t
+
/−
 s
d*
(Va
lu
e 
of
 P
C 
cu
rv
e
)
+++++++++++++
++++++++++++++++++++
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
PC 2 (3.9%)
t
+
/−
 s
d*
(Va
lu
e 
of
 P
C 
cu
rv
e
)
+++++
+++
+++
++
++
++
++
+
+
+
+
++
++++
++++−−−−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−−−−−
−20 −10 0 10
−
10
−
5
0
5
Formation: Component Score, Receiver
Component 1
Co
m
po
ne
nt
 2
AFG
ALB
DZA
AGO
ARG
ARMAUS
AUT
AZE
BHR
BGD
BLR
BEL
BEN
BTN
BOL
BIH
BWA
BRA
BGR
BFA
BDI
KHM
CMR
CAN
CPVCAF
TCD
CHL
CHN COL
COM
COG
CRI
CIVHRV
CUB
CYP
CZR
CZE
DNK DJI
DOM ZAR
ECU
EGY
SLV
GNQ
ERIEST
ETH
FJI
FIN
FRA
GAB
GMB GE
GDR
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
GIN
GNB
GUY
HTI
HND
HUN
IND
IDN
IRN
IRQ
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KWT
KGZ
LAO
LVA
LBN
LSO
LBR
LBY
LTU
LUX
MKD
MD
MWI
MYS
MLI
M T
MUS MEX
MDA
MNG
MAR
OZ
MMR
NAMNPL
NLD
NZL
N C
NER
NGA
PRK
NOR MN
PAK
PAN
PNG
PRY
PER
PHLPOL
PRT
QATROM
RUS RWA
SAU
SEN
SRB
SLE
SGPSVK
SVN
SOM
ZAF
KOR
SVNYEM
SUN
ESP
LK
SDNSUR
SWZ
SWE
CHE
SYR
TWN
TJK
TZA
THA
TMP TGO
TTO
TUN
TUR
TKM
UGA
UKR
ARE
GBR
USA
URY
UZB
VEN
VNM YEM
YUG
ZMBZWE
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
PC 1 (78%)
t
+
/−
 s
d*
(Va
lu
e 
of
 P
C 
cu
rv
e
)
++++++++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−
−−
−−
−−
−−
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
PC 2 (16.7%)
t
+
/−
 s
d*
(Va
lu
e 
of
 P
C 
cu
rv
e
)
++++++++
++++
+++
+++
+++
+++
++++
+++++−−−−−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−−−−
Figure 6: Functional principal component analysis of the smooth random effects in the
formation model for the sender (top) and the receiver (bottom). Scores of the random effects
for the first two principal components are given on the left. Mean principal component curve
(zero line) and the effects of adding (+) and subtracting the principal component curve are
given on the right.
This means that the export dynamics are mainly driven by countries with relatively high
sender effects.
Figures 6 and 7 show very well that fundamental changes of the system are driven by the
end of the cold war. This can be seen exemplary regarding the position of the Soviet Union
(SUN) and Czechoslovakia (CZE) in the top left in Figures 6 and 7 (both with a high level
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Figure 7: Functional principal component analysis of the smooth random effects in the
persistence model for the sender (top) and the receiver (bottom). Scores of the random
effects for the first two principal components are given on the left. Mean principal component
curve (zero line) and the effects of adding (+) and subtracting the principal component curve
are given on the right.
for component 1 and a low level for component 2). This mirrors that these countries left the
system shortly after the collapse of the eastern bloc. However, this turning point affected not
only exporters but also importers and consequently the representation of the receiver effects
of the formation model at the bottom left of Figure 6 is populated with (former) socialist
countries such as Cuba (CUB), Ukraine (UKR), North Korea (PRK), Yugoslavia (YUG) and
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Moldova (MDA). Additionally, we find a prominent position for Romania (ROM), being a
country that has a high level (high value for component 1) but decreased its’ tendency to be a
receiver in persistent trade relations (low value for component 2) in Figure 7. However, while
some of the countries of the eastern block ceased to exist or strongly reduced their exports or
imports we also find a contrary pattern. Countries like Ukraine (UKR) and Bulgaria (BGR)
have managed to increase their sender effect in the formation as well as in the persistence
model with time (high value for component 1 and component 2 in the top left of Figures 6
and 7). This indicates that some left overs of the collapsed Soviet Union defence industries
sold off their stocks and rushed into the global market of military products.
Besides the massive shift initiated by the end of the cold war, we see that some dominant
exporting countries, especially Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA) and Egypt (EGY), lost
importance over time. This countries can be found in the fourth quadrant of the top left
panels in Figures 6 and 7, meaning their high sender effects decreased strongly with time.
This might seem surprising since France and Great Britain are still among the countries with
the highest exported volumes. However, France and Great Britain have left their dominance
over former colonies leading to a loss of control over many potential importers. The general
pattern also carries over to their receiver effects. Looking at the scores of Great Britain
(GBR) and France (FRA) at the bottom left of Figure 7 we see a strong decrease of their
receiver effects in the persistence model.
Apart from global patterns, some countries exhibit exceptional scores that can be traced
back to country-specific circumstances. We find that Japan (JPN) stands out among the
countries with the lowest proclivity to import (see the low scores for components 1 and 2
at the bottom left of Figure 6). Even more pronounced is the astonishing low tendency to
export, mirrored by Japan’s sender effect in the persistence models (Figure 7, top left) and
the strongly declining sender effect in the formation model (Figure 6, top left). This stands
in contrast to the fact that Japan is among the wealthiest countries with a highly developed
export industry and is clearly due to the highly restrictive arms export principles introduced
in 1967, and tightened in 1976. This ban on exports was only lifted in 2014 (Hughes 2018;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014).
Another, very notable case is Israel (ISR), being somehow the opposite pole in comparison
to Japan (JPN). The sender effects on the top left of Figures 6 and 7 show that Israel (ISR)
has an outstanding tendency to establish and maintain arms exports. On the other hand,
Israel (ISR) takes a very polar position in the bottom left of Figure 6 as a consequence of
a strongly decreased (i.e. low level for component 2) receiver effect in the formation model.
These results reflect the country’s path of developing highly internationally competitive
weapons systems and its’ rise to be one of the most important exporters. This stands in
contrast to countries like Mexico (MEX), being the country with the least tendency to form
new trade exports (top left in Figure 6). It appears that this country is not able to be
a relevant player in the market despite being among the worlds’ largest economies. We
consider these special paths as induced by cumulative advantages and learning over time in
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the one case (Israel), whereas in the case of Mexico (MEX) we observe the stickiness and
path inertia of a country having not been able to make its defence products sold externally.
There remain many other interesting cases. For example the rise of South Africa (ZAF)
as an exporter in the formation model (top left in Figure 6), mirroring the history of the
country, being initially dependent on imports and now among the major exporters of MCW.
We also find that Ireland (IRL) strongly increased its tendency to be a persistent importer
after its entry to the European Union (bottom left in Figure 7) while Germany (DEU) and
Canada (CAN) strongly increased their roles as persistent exporters (top left in Figure 7).
4.3. Model evaluation
The evaluation of the out-of-sample predictive power is based on the following steps. We
first fit the formation model as well as the persistence model, based on the information in
t− 1, to the data in t and use the estimated coefficients for the prediction of new formation
or persistence of existing ties in t+1. As the predictions are probabilistic by their nature, we
weight the recall (true positive rate) against the false positive rate for varying threshold levels,
yielding the ROC curve and the AUC for each year of prediction. Because arms transfers
can be regarded as rare events we also compute the PR curve and the corresponding AUC.
The results are plotted in Figure 8 with the AUC values that correspond to the PR curves
on the left and the one corresponding to the ROC curves on the right. The first row gives
the evaluation of the formation model and the second row shows the persistence model.
While the AUC values in the formation model are very high when evaluated at the ROC
curves they are much lower with the PR curves. This is a consequence of being right quite
frequently if a zero is predicted, while its is hard to forecast the actual transfers in the next
period in case of the formation model. Interestingly, the opposite holds for the persistence
model. In the combined version at the bottom of Figure 8 the AUC values derived from the
PR curve show that the model does quite well.
Additionally, we evaluate how well global network structures like the mean outdegree,
the share of reciprocity and observed transitivity can be mirrored by the predictions using
a simulation-based approach (see Hunter et al. 2008). To do so, we fit the models for the
transition between t − 1 and t and simulate from the formation model an the persistence
model 1, 000 times based on the information in t. Then, based on equation (1), the predicted
network for t + 1 is constructed. From this, we evaluate global network characteristics and
compare them to the actual characteristics from the true MCW trade network in t+ 1. The
corresponding Figure 11 is given in the Appendix A.4. The results are reassuring and the
simulated networks mirror the real network properties in an acceptable way.
Clearly the proposed model is not the only suitable network model. Alternatively, it
is possible to analyse the data with a STERGM without random effects and with various
variants of the ERGM or the TERGM with and without random effect. We discuss this
extensively in the Supplementary Material and show that the out-of-sample predictive power
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Figure 8: Time series of area under the curve (AUC) values for precision recall (PR) on the
left and AUC values for the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) on the right. Formation
model in the first row, persistence model in the second row and their combination in the last
row.
of our model is superior to all other fitted candidate models.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we employ a dynamic separable network model as introduced by Krivitsky and
Handcock (2014) and add techniques proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1993) and Durba´n
et al. (2005). This enables us to study the process of formation and persistence separately
as well as the inclusion of time-varying coefficients and smooth time-varying random effects
that are further analysed by methods from functional data analysis as described in Ramsay
and Silverman (2005).
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Applied to the discretized MCW networks from 1950 to 2016 we find that the mechanisms
leading to formation and persistence differ fundamentally. Most importantly, the formation
is driven by network effects and security related variables, while the persistence of transfers
is dominated the military expenditures of the receiving country. A careful analysis of the
random effects exhibits a high variation among the countries as well as along the time
dimension. By using functional principal component analysis we decompose the functional
time series of smooth random effects in order find countries that have increased or decreased
their relative importance in the network. The evaluation of the fit confirms that the chosen
model is able to give good out-of-sample predictions.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Descriptives
In Figure 9, the binary network is shown for the years 2015 and 2016. Table 1 gives the
categories of arms that are included in the analysis. All types with explanations are taken
from SIPRI (2017b). The 171 countries that are included in our analysis can be found in
Table 2, together with the three-digit country codes that are used to abbreviate countries
in the paper. In addition to that, the time periods, for which we coded the countries as
existent are included. Note that the SIPRI data set contains more than 171 arm trading
entities but we excluded non-states and countries with no (reliable) covariates available. In
the covariate GDP some missings are present in the data. No time series of covariates for the
selected countries is completely missing (those countries are excluded from the analysis) and
the major share of them is complete but there are series with some missing values. This is
sometimes the case in the year 1990 and/or 1991 where the former socialist countries splitted
up or had some transition time. In other cases values at the beginning or at the end of the
series are missing. We have decided on three general rules to fill the gaps: First, if a value
for a certain country is missing in t but there are values available in t−1 and t+1, the mean
of those is used. If the values are missing at the end of the observational period, the last
value observed is taken. In case of missing values in the beginning, the first value observed
is taken.
The series on military expenditures are imputed similarly, using linear interpolation by
employing the R package imputeTS by Moritz (2016).
The number of countries included each year in the network is provided in the upper left
panel of Figure 10. It can be seen that the network is growing almost each year until 1992,
with two big leaps that show the effects of the decolonization, beginning in 1960 and the
end of the Soviet Union after 1991. Typical descriptive statistics for the analysis of networks
are Density, Reciprocity and Transitivity, all shown in Figure 10. The Density is defined
as the number of edges divided by the number of possible edges. Reciprocity is defined as
the share of trade flows being reciprocal. Transitivity is defined as the ratio of triangles and
connected triples in the graph.
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Figure 9: Network of international transfers of major conventional weapons (MCW) in 2015
(top) and 2016 (bottom). Countries are represented by vertices and directed edges represent
arms exports. Vertex sizes are scaled proportional to the logarithmic outdegree (number of
outgoing edges).
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Figure 10: Time series from 1950 to 2016 of global network statistics for the international
arms trade network for the included countries. Number of countries included on the top left
panel. Number of realized transfers relative to the number of possible transfers on the top
right Panel. Share of reciprocated transfers on the bottom left panel. Ratio of undirected
triangles relative to connected triples on the bottom right.
III
Type Explanation
Aircraft All fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, including unmanned aircraft with a minimum
loaded weight of 20 kg. Exceptions are microlight aircraft, powered and unpowered
gliders and target drones.
Air-defence systems (a) All land-based surface-to-air missile systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft guns with
a calibre of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a combined caliber of
at least 70 mm. This includes self-propelled systems on armoured or unarmoured
chassis.
Anti-submarine warfare weapons Rocket launchers, multiple rocket launchers and mortars for use against submarines,
with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.
Armoured vehicles All vehicles with integral armour protection, including all types of tank, tank de-
stroyer, armoured car, armoured personnel carrier, armoured support vehicle and
infantry fighting vehicle. Vehicles with very light armour protection (such as trucks
with an integral but lightly armoured cabin) are excluded.
Artillery Naval, fixed, self-propelled and towed guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers and
mortars, with a calibre equal to or above 100 mm.
Engines (a) Engines for military aircraft, for example, combat-capable aircraft, larger military
transport and support aircraft, including large helicopters; (b) Engines for combat
ships -,fast attack craft, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers and
submarines; (c) Engines for most armoured vehicles - generally engines of more than
200 horsepower output.∗
Missiles (a) All powered, guided missiles and torpedoes, and (b) all unpowered but guided
bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence systems and portable
guided anti-tank missiles. Unguided rockets, free-fall aerial munitions, anti-submarine
rockets and target drones are excluded.
Sensors (a) All land-, aircraft- and ship-based active (radar) and passive (e.g. electro-optical)
surveillance systems with a range of at least 25 kilometres, with the exception of
navigation and weather radars, (b) all fire-control radars, with the exception of range-
only radars, and (c) anti-submarine warfare and anti-ship sonar systems for ships and
helicopters.∗
Ships (a) All ships with a standard tonnage of 100 tonnes or more, and (b) all ships armed
with artillery of 100-mm calibre or more, torpedoes or guided missiles, and (c) all
ships below 100 tonnes where the maximum speed (in kmh) multiplied with the full
tonnage equals 3500 or more. Exceptions are most survey ships, tugs and some
transport ships
Other (a) All turrets for armoured vehicles fitted with a gun of at least 12.7 mm calibre or
with guided anti-tank missiles, (b) all turrets for ships fitted with a gun of at least
57-mm calibre, and (c) all turrets for ships fitted with multiple guns with a combined
calibre of at least 57 mm, and (d) air refueling systems as used on tanker aircraft.∗
∗In cases where the system is fitted on a platform (vehicle, aircraft or ship), the database only includes those
systems that come from a different supplier from the supplier of the platform.
The Arms Transfers Database does not cover other military equipment such as small arms and light weapons
(SALW) other than portable guided missiles such as man-portable air defence systems and guided anti-tank
missiles. Trucks, artillery under 100-mm calibre, ammunition, support equipment and components (other
than those mentioned above), repair and support services or technology transfers are also not included in the
database.
Source: SIPRI (2017b)
Table 1: Types of weapon systems included in the SIPRI arms trade database.
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Country Code Included Country Code Included Country Code Included
Afghanistan AFG 1950 - 2016 German Dem. Rep. GDR 1950 - 1991 Pakistan PAK 1950 - 2016
Albania ALB 1950 - 2016 Germany DEU 1950 - 2016 Panama PAN 1950 - 2016
Algeria DZA 1962 - 2016 Ghana GHA 1957 - 2016 Papua New Guin. PNG 1975 - 2016
Angola AGO 1975 - 2016 Greece GRC 1950 - 2016 Paraguay PRY 1950 - 2016
Argentina ARG 1950 - 2016 Guatemala GTM 1950 - 2016 Peru PER 1950 - 2016
Armenia ARM 1991 - 2016 Guinea GIN 1958 - 2016 Philippines PHL 1950 - 2016
Australia AUS 1950 - 2016 Guinea-Bissau GNB 1973 - 2016 Poland POL 1950 - 2016
Austria AUT 1950 - 2016 Guyana GUY 1966 - 2016 Portugal PRT 1950 - 2016
Azerbaijan AZE 1991 - 2016 Haiti HTI 1950 - 2016 Qatar QAT 1971 - 2016
Bahrain BHR 1971 - 2016 Honduras HND 1950 - 2016 Romania ROM 1950 - 2016
Bangladesh BGD 1971 - 2016 Hungary HUN 1950 - 2016 Russia RUS 1992 - 2016
Belarus BLR 1991 - 2016 India IND 1950 - 2016 Rwanda RWA 1962 - 2016
Belgium BEL 1950 - 2016 Indonesia IDN 1950 - 2016 Saudi Arabia SAU 1950 - 2016
Benin BEN 1961 - 2016 Iran IRN 1950 - 2016 Senegal SEN 1960 - 2016
Bhutan BTN 1950 - 2016 Iraq IRQ 1950 - 2016 Serbia SRB 1992 - 2016
Bolivia BOL 1950 - 2016 Ireland IRL 1950 - 2016 Sierra Leone SLE 1961 - 2016
Bosnia Herzegov. BIH 1992 - 2016 Israel ISR 1950 - 2016 Singapore SGP 1965 - 2016
Botswana BWA 1966 - 2016 Italy ITA 1950 - 2016 Slovakia SVK 1993 - 2016
Brazil BRA 1950 - 2016 Jamaica JAM 1962 - 2016 Slovenia SVN 1991 - 2016
Bulgaria BGR 1950 - 2016 Japan JPN 1950 - 2016 Solomon Islands SLB 1978 - 2016
Burkina Faso BFA 1960 - 2016 Jordan JOR 1950 - 2016 Somalia SOM 1960 - 2016
Burundi BDI 1962 - 2016 Kazakhstan KAZ 1991 - 2016 South Africa ZAF 1950 - 2016
Cambodia KHM 1953 - 2016 Kenya KEN 1963 - 2016 Soviet Union SUN 1950 - 1991
Cameroon CMR 1960 - 2016 North Korea PRK 1950 - 2016 Spain ESP 1950 - 2016
Canada CAN 1950 - 2016 South Korea KOR 1950 - 2016 Sri Lanka LKA 1950 - 2016
Cape Verde CPV 1975 - 2016 Kuwait KWT 1961 - 2016 Sudan SDN 1956 - 2016
Central Afr. Rep. CAF 1960 - 2016 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1991 - 2016 Suriname SUR 1975 - 2016
Chad TCD 1960 - 2016 Laos LAO 1950 - 2016 Swaziland SWZ 1968 - 2016
Chile CHL 1950 - 2016 Latvia LVA 1991 - 2016 Sweden SWE 1950 - 2016
China CHN 1950 - 2016 Lebanon LBN 1950 - 2016 Switzerland CHE 1950 - 2016
Colombia COL 1950 - 2016 Lesotho LSO 1966 - 2016 Syria SYR 1950 - 2016
Comoros COM 1975 - 2016 Liberia LBR 1950 - 2016 Taiwan TWN 1950 - 2016
DR Congo ZAR 1960 - 2016 Libya LBY 1951 - 2016 Tajikistan TJK 1991 - 2016
Congo COG 1960 - 2016 Lithuania LTU 1990 - 2016 Tanzania TZA 1961 - 2016
Costa Rica CRI 1950 - 2016 Luxembourg LUX 1950 - 2016 Thailand THA 1950 - 2016
Cote dIvoire CIV 1960 - 2016 Macedonia MKD 1991 - 2016 Timor-Leste TMP 2002 - 2016
Croatia HRV 1991 - 2016 Madagascar MDG 1960 - 2016 Togo TGO 1960 - 2016
Cuba CUB 1950 - 2016 Malawi MWI 1964 - 2016 Trinidad Tobago TTO 1962 - 2016
Cyprus CYP 1960 - 2016 Malaysia MYS 1957 - 2016 Tunisia TUN 1956 - 2016
Czech Republic CZR 1993 - 2016 Mali MLI 1960 - 2016 Turkey TUR 1950 - 2016
Czechoslovakia CZE 1950 - 1991 Mauritania MRT 1960 - 2016 Turkmenistan TKM 1991 - 2016
Denmark DNK 1950 - 2016 Mauritius MUS 1968 - 2016 Uganda UGA 1962 - 2016
Djibouti DJI 1977 - 2016 Mexico MEX 1950 - 2016 Ukraine UKR 1991 - 2016
Dominican Rep. DOM 1950 - 2016 Moldova MDA 1991 - 2016 Un. Arab Emirates ARE 1971 - 2016
Ecuador ECU 1950 - 2016 Mongolia MNG 1950 - 2016 United Kingdom GBR 1950 - 2016
Egypt EGY 1950 - 2016 Morocco MAR 1956 - 2016 United States USA 1950 - 2016
El Salvador SLV 1950 - 2016 Mozambique MOZ 1975 - 2016 Uruguay URY 1950 - 2016
Equatorial Guin. GNQ 1968 - 2016 Myanmar MMR 1950 - 2016 Uzbekistan UZB 1991 - 2016
Eritrea ERI 1993 - 2016 Namibia NAM 1990 - 2016 Venezuela VEN 1950 - 2016
Estonia EST 1991 - 2016 Nepal NPL 1950 - 2016 Vietnam VNM 1976 - 2016
Ethiopia ETH 1950 - 2016 Netherlands NLD 1950 - 2016 South Vietnam SVM 1950 - 1975
Fiji FJI 1970 - 2016 New Zealand NZL 1950 - 2016 Yemen YEM 1991 - 2016
Finland FIN 1950 - 2016 Nicaragua NIC 1950 - 2016 North Yemen NYE 1950 - 1991
France FRA 1950 - 2016 Niger NER 1960 - 2016 South Yemen SYE 1950 - 1991
Gabon GAB 1960 - 2016 Nigeria NGA 1960 - 2016 Yugoslavia YUG 1950 - 1992
Gambia GMB 1965 - 2016 Norway NOR 1950 - 2016 Zambia ZMB 1964 - 2016
Georgia GEO 1991 - 2016 Oman OMN 1950 - 2016 Zimbabwe ZWE 1950 - 2016
Table 2: Countries included in the analysis (columns 1, 4 and 7) with three-digit country
codes (columns 2, 5 and 8) and time period of inclusion in the model (columns 3, 6 and 9).
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A.2. Details on the estimation procedure
The recent implementation of Generalised Additive Models (GAM) in the R package mgcv
allows for smooth varying coefficients as proposed by Hastie and Tibshirani (1993). These
models can be represented in GAMs by multiplying the smooths by a covariate (in the given
application the smooths of time are multiplied by the covariates. See Wood (2017) for more
details.
The functions for the smooths are based on P-Splines as proposed by Eilers and Marx
(1996), giving low rank smoothers using a B-spline basis using a simple difference penalty
applied to the parameters. For the smooth time-varying coefficients on the fixed effects a
maximum number of 65 knots is used, combined with a second-order P-spline basis (quadratic
splines) and a first-order difference penalty on the coefficients.
The non-linear random smooths are estimated similar to those proposed by Durba´n et al.
(2005). As a basic idea, one views the individual smooths as splines with random coefficients,
i.e. each country has a random effect, that is in fact a function of time that is approximated
by regression splines. The parameters of the splines are assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and the same variance for all curves, which translates into having the same
smoothness parameter for all curves. This concept is implemented efficiently in the GAM
structure of the mgcv package by using the nesting of the smooth within the respective actor.
In order to avoid overfitting and keeping computation tractable, a first-order penalty with
nine knots is employed. The smoothness selection is done for all smooths by the restricted
maximum likelihood criterion (REML).
As the data set is rather big with more than 1.3 million observations in the formation
model, the fitting procedure of the model is computationally expensive and was virtually
impossible with standard implementations in R before the introduction of the bam() function
in the mgcv package in 2016 that needs less memory and is much faster than other comparable
packages. The estimation routine employs techniques as proposed in Wood et al. (2015).
Those methods use discretization of covariate values and iterative updating schemes that
require only subblocks of the model matrix to the computed at once which allows for the
application of parallelization tools.
For all computations we also used the statistical programming language R (R Development
Core Team 2008). Important packages used for visualization of networks and computation of
network statistics are the statnet suite of network analysis packages (Handcock et al. 2008)
as well as the package igraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006). For the Tables the stargazer
package from Hlavac (2013) was employed. For the model evaluation and visualization we
used the PRROC package of Grau et al. (2015).
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A.3. Details on the PCA of the time-varying smooth random ef-
fects
For the analysis of the smooth random effects we are following the discretization approach
of Ramsay and Silverman (2005, Chap. 8). As noted in Section 3.3 we assume the random
effects φi(t) (φ
+
i (t) and φ
−
i (t) in the formation and the persistence model, respectively) to
be realizations of a stochastic process Φ = {φ(t), t ∈ τ}, for i = 1, ..., N individual countries
and τ = [1951, 2016].
In order to summarize the information provided by these functions we are searching for
a weight function β(t) that gives us the principal component scores φi =
∫
τ
β(t)φi(t)dt. In
order to do so, the weight function ξ1(t) among all possible functions β(t) must be found
that maximizes N−1
∑N
i=1(
∫
τ
β(t)φi(t)dt)
2 subject to the constraint
∫
τ
ξ21(t)dt = 1. From our
model we get N individual estimated functions φˆi(t) for all observations (countries) and can
discretize the functions φˆi(t) on a grid. We use T = 100 equidistant points {t1, ..., t100} on
the interval τ of length |τ | = T . This gives a discretized (N × T ) time series matrix Φˆ with
N country specific observations in the rows and the estimated functions, evaluated at the
discrete time points, in the columns:
Φˆ =
 φˆ1(t1) · · · φˆ1(t100)... . . . ...
φˆN(t1) · · · φˆN(t100)

Therefore, in fact we are searching for a solution for the discrete approximation of∫
τ
β(t)φˆi(t)dt ≈ (T /T )
T∑
j=1
β(tj)φˆi(tj) =
T∑
j=1
β˜(tj)φˆi(tj)
such that the solution ξ˜1 that maximizes the mean square satisfies ||ξ˜1||2 = 1. This is now a
standard problem, with the solution ξ˜1 being found by the eigenvector that corresponds to
the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of Φˆ.
A.4. Out-of-sample-predictions for simulated networks
As a standard principle in network analysis, a model should be able the reflect global network
characteristics. We evaluate six of them for our out-of-sample forecasts. The first three
characteristics are related to the number of actors that are actively engaged in the arms
trade. The statistic Size is defined as the count of predicted edges in each year. This
measure helps to evaluate the ability of the model to predict amount of realized arms trade
in each year. As it is also of interest to measure how dense the predicted arms trade network
VII
is, we include Density, relating the size of the network to the number of edges that could
have potentially realized. We define the Order of the network as number of actors that
are engaged in either exporting or importing arms. The results will provide an impression
whether the model has the ability not only to classify the right amount of edges (as in Size),
but also their nesting within the countries.
As we have emphasized the importance of local network statistics we evaluate whether the
local network statistics are able to generate the corresponding global statistics. Therefore,
we include the Mean Indegree (being the same as Mean Outdegree), as well as the share of
Reciprocity. In order to evaluate the accuracy of our predictions with respect to triangular
relationships we furthermore include the measure Transitivity, that divides the number of
triangles by the number of connected triples in the graph. In this statistic, the direction
of the edges is ignored. The analysis of this measure gives an impression how well the two
chosen transitivity measures capture the overall clustering in the network.
The results are presented in Figure 11. In each of the six panels we see the respective
network statistics plotted against time. The solid red line gives the network statistics,
evaluated at the real MCW network. The boxplots show the network statistics, evaluated
for each year for the 1.000 simulated networks.
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Figure 11: Comparison of realized and simulated network topologies. The boxplots give
statistics from the simulated networks. The solid line gives the statistics for the real networks.
Number of edges (Size), number of active countries (Order), number of realized transfers
relative to possible transfers (Density), average indegree (Indegree), share of reciprocated
transfers and ratio of undirected triangles relative to connected triples (Transitivity).
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Figure 12: Kernel density estimate (KDE) of arms exports, measured in TIV and pooled
over all years from 1950 to 2016. Logarithmic x-axis.
B. Supplementary Material
B.1. Different threshold values
B.1.1. Distribution of TIVs
In Figure 12 we present a kernel density estimate (KDE) of the pooled TIVs for the whole
time period. The distribution of the TIVs is highly skewed and has a long tail. Therefore,
we give a logarithmic representation. In order to give an impression of the left tail, Table 3
provides the lower quantiles of the distribution. From this it can be seen that roughly 20%
of all observations are below a threshold of 3.
0% 4.75% 9.5% 14.25% 19%
0.020 0.700 1.332 2.200 3
Table 3: Lower quantiles of the TIV distribution pooled over all years from 1950 to 2016.
In order to demonstrate the effect of different binarization thresholds on the estimated
coefficients we pursue the following strategy. As a baseline we use the ”original effects” from
the paper with a threshold of zero and plot them in solid black together with two standard
error confidence bounds in dark grey. Additionally, we include the estimated coefficients
with thresholds incrementing from zero to three in steps of 0.5 as dashed black lines. (i)
X
By comparison of the solid line with the dashed lines it can be seen how strong the point-
estimates vary with different thresholds. (ii) If the dashed lines are within the confidence
intervals in dark grey they can be said to be statistically indistinguishable from the original
estimates. (iii) Furthermore, we show how the confidence bounds of the new estimates exceed
the ones of the original estimation, displayed in light grey. These areas represent the highest
upper limit and the lowest lower limit that exceeds the original confidence bounds. Hence, if
only the dark grey confidence bound is visible, then the effects of all estimates are the same,
if the light grey confidence bound is above and/or below the dark grey, this means that the
bounds of the estimates with higher thresholds are wider.
B.1.2. Fixed effects with different thresholds
The degree-related statistics are shown in the top four panels of Figures 13. We find no
significant changes of the results as the dashed lines stay in almost all cases within the
original confidence bounds. An exception is the senders’ outdegree in the formation model
but even with the highest threshold this effect does not become significant. On the contrary,
partly the results get even more clear. For example the outdegree effect for the receiver in
the formation and dissolution model (second row) becomes even more negative in tendency
with increasing thresholds.
For the reciprocity effect in the third row we find that the coefficients stay almost the
same for all different thresholds of binarization. The same applies for the transitivity effect
in the formation model (left panel in the fourth row). Here the upper confidence bound
even indicates a potentially higher effect. For the transitivity in the persistence model (right
panel in the fourth row) we find that the effect becomes insignificant in the beginning if we
set roughly 20% of the lowest observations to zero. Otherwise the effect stays significant and
very close to the point estimates of the original estimation.
For the Shared Suppliers Effect (the two panels at the bottom) the results are very similar
to the transitivity effects, i.e. we find an potentially stronger effect in the formation model
(left panel at the bottom) and an insignificant effect for the first years in the persistence
model (right panel) with the highest binarization threshold.
Given that the network statistics are constructed from the network and therefore directly
and potentially strongly affected by different thresholds, the robustness of the effects is
reassuring. Only if we replace almost one fifth of the existing edges by zeros the effects
of the hypderdyadic statistics in the persistence model start to become partly insignificant.
However, the affected statistics are in line with our theoretical expectation that the network
effects matter mostly for the formation.
From this result it might not come as a surprise that the effects of the non-network related
covariates are even more robust because their construction is not affected by the thinning of
the network. We can confirm Akerman and Seim (2014) with Figure 14 that shows virtually
no noteworthy changes of the effects.
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Figure 13: Comparison of fixed effects for network statistics with different binarization
thresholds ranging from zero to three, incrementing by 0.5. The estimates with a threshold
of zero are given in solid black with dark grey confidence bounds. All other estimates are
indicated by dashed lines. Confidence bounds derived from estimates with higher thresholds
in light grey.
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Figure 14: Comparison of fixed effects for economic and political Covariates with different
binarization thresholds ranging from zero to three, incrementing by 0.5. The estimates with
a threshold of zero are given in solid black with dark grey confidence bounds. All other
estimates are indicated by dashed lines. Confidence bounds derived from estimates with
higher thresholds in light grey. XIII
B.2. Different time windows
In the paper we assume that the STERGM process applies to two consecutive years. As a
robustness check, we define the periods t and t+ 1 such that they contain multiple years. If
we take the years 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 as an example for time windows of length two,
we set Y t−1,tij = 1 if country i exports arms to j in 2013 or 2014 and Y
t,t−1
ij = 0 if country i
has not exported to j neither in 2015 nor in 2016. We also extend this concept such that we
combine three years into one period.
For the non-network related covariates we are using the time averages for the respective
time windows for continuous variables (e.g. if a period contains two years, the average of
the GDP in these two years is taken) and we set binary variables to one if the respective
feature was present in all year (e.g. the indicator for a formal alliance is one if the alliance
was present in all two or three years).
The corresponding estimates can be seen in Figures 15 and 16. (i) The Figures are
constructed such that the baseline is given by the ”original effects” from the paper. These
effects are plotted in solid black together with two standard error confidence bounds in dark
grey. (ii) The coefficients with two or three years within one time period are given in dotted
(two years) and dotted-dashed (three years). (iii) The area where the original confidence
bounds are exceeded is given in light grey.
In Figure 15 it can be seen that the dotted and dashed-dotted line rarely is outside of
the dark grey confidence bound in the panels of rows one to three. One really noteworthy
exception applies to the transitivity effect in the formation model. Here the estimates with
periods containing three years behave somewhat more time-constant than the original es-
timates. This is, however, a natural result because with the broader time windows major
changes in the data as the collapse of the Soviet Union become more smooth. All in all, the
panels clearly show that the coefficients are very robust and do not change fundamentally.
This impression is confirmed by Figure 16 where again no notable exceptions can be found
influence the interpretation in terms of variation with time or significance. This is again in
line with our theoretical expectations since the coefficient for the military expenditures of
the receiver is almost not affected by different time windows.
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Figure 15: Comparison of fixed effects for network statistics with different time windows. The
original estimates are given in solid black with dark grey confidence bounds. The estimates
with time windows containing two years are given in dotted and those with three years in
dotted-dashed. Confidence bounds derived from estimates with broader time windows in
light grey.
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Figure 16: Comparison of fixed effects for economic and political covariates with different
time windows. The original estimates are given in solid black with dark grey confidence
bounds. The estimates with time windows containing two years are given in dotted and
those with three years in dotted-dashed. Confidence bounds derived from estimates with
broader time windows in light grey. XVI
B.3. Model without random effects
In the main article we mentioned that the inclusion of the random effects leads to a vanishing
global effect of the senders outdegree. I.e once controlled for the sender-specific random
effect the coefficient on the outdegree statistic is insignificant. Here, we show that once we
exclude random effects from the models, all results are very robust with the exception of the
coefficient on the outdegree. This can be seen in Figures 17 and 18 with coefficients that
are very comparable to the ones from the main paper. The main exception is given by the
senders outdegree (top panels in Figure 17). Here the coefficients are now in both models
positive and significant. Especially in the formation effect the coefficient is very high. This
shows that there is indeed a global effect of the senders outdegree that, however, vanishes if
one controls for country-specific heterogeneity.
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Figure 17: Time-varying coefficients of network statistics without random effects in solid
black. Shaded areas give two standard error bounds.
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Figure 18: Time-varying coefficients of economic and political covariates without random
effects in solid black. Shaded areas give two standard error bounds.
XIX
B.4. Comparison of different methods
B.4.1. Theoretical discussion
Besides the STERGM, there are many other models suitable for dynamic networks. In
the following, we provide an overview of alternative approaches with a discussion of their
suitability for the given dataset.
Latent Space Models: A potential alternative is given by the family of latent space models
(e.g. Hoff et al. 2002; Handcock et al. 2007). However, it is hard to model arms trade
appropriately within this model class. The need of estimating time-varying coefficients results
in yearly separate estimations. The resulting yearly latent space representations are not very
stable and do not work well with isolates, i.e. countries without transfers in a given year. If
one goes for a panel approach with this model class (see the package amen by Hoff et al. 2015)
one must accept that the coefficients stay the same for the whole time-period and, even more
problematic, that the positions within one latent space are sufficient to capture all network
dependencies for the time-period 1950-2016, which is clearly a heroic assumption. On top
of that, the latent space approach does not allow for the evaluation of complex network
statistics we are interested in.
Stochastic-Actor Oriented Models: Stochastic-Actor Oriented Model (SAOM, see e.g. Sni-
jders et al. 2010) are built for modelling dynamic networks and have the virtue of allowing
for the estimation of dyadic and hyper-dyadic network effects. However, the model is tai-
lored for social networks and some of its’ assumptions are very problematic for modelling
the arms trade network. Most importantly, it assumes actor-homogeneity, an assumption
that is clearly violated for the dataset. Additionally, the SAOM fundamentally builds on the
idea that the networks observed represent snapshots of a continuous underlying process of
edge formation and persistence, i.e. we would need to assume that between t and t+ 1 mul-
tiple changes could have been realized in the network. This is not an acceptable assumption
because if a transfer between i and j was recorded in t and t + 1, it is not meaningful to
assume that there exists an in-between state where the transfer has the change to disappear
and re-emerged multiple times. Otherwise, if no transfer is recorded in t and t + 1 we have
no reason to believe that there was trade in between. In the basic description of the SAOM
(Snijders et al. 2010, p. 54) the authors write: ”A foundational assumption of the models
discussed in this paper is that the network ties are not brief events, but can be regarded as
states with a tendency to endure over time. Many relations commonly studied in network
analysis naturally satisfy this requirement of gradual change, such as friendship, trust, and
cooperation.” Apparently it is hard to argue that recording whether there was a transfer
between two countries in a given year can be viewed as an enduring state.
Exponential Random Graph Models: Our model is in fact motivated by recent advances
within the exponential random graph model (ERGM) family, i.e. the TERGM (Hanneke et al.
2010, Snijders et al. 2010, Leifeld et al. 2018) and the STERGM (Krivitsky and Handcock
XX
2014). However, our model differs from the standard cross-sectional ERGM (but also from
the conventional TERGM and STERGM) because it does not allow for simultaneous network
dependencies. In general, a static cross-sectional ERGM seems to be an implausible choice for
the modelling of a dynamic network with strong actor heterogeneity. A dynamic formation
and the TERGM, however, can be constructed in a very similar manner as the STERGM.
Those models are natural candidate model for comparison.
B.4.2. Candidate models
In the following we present several alternative candidate models by increasing level of com-
plexity.
Autoregressive ERGM (Model 1): The most simplistic stochastic model is an autoregressive
model that assumes time-dependence of all individual dyads such that
log
{
P (Y t,t−1ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
P (Y t,t−1ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
}
= θ0 + θ1y
t−1,t
ij . (4)
This temporal dependence structure can be interpreted as a cross sectional ERGM with the
lagged response as a dyadic exogenous covariate or as a TERGM with a dyadic stability term
(see e.g. Block et al. 2018). It is motivated by the idea that the probability of a transfer in
t might change if there was a transfer in t− 1.
TERGM with covariates (Model 2): We can change model (4) by including all the network
effects and covariates as specified in Section 3.2 of the main paper:
log
{
P (Y t,t−1ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
P (Y t,t−1ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
}
= θg˜ij(y
t−1,t, xt−1,t) (5)
In this formulation, we include the autoregressive component only indirectly, the lagged
network statistics give some information about the network embedding of a transfer but not
whether there was a preceding transfer.
TERGM with covariates and random effects (Model 3): With the inclusion of smooth time-
varying random effects for the sender and the receiver we have
log
{
P (Y t,t−1ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
P (Y t,t−1ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
}
=θg˜ij(y
t−1,t, xt−1,t)
+ φi,sender(t) + φj,receiver(t).
(6)
The main difference to the STERGM is now that we do not model the processes of formation
and persistence separately but within one model and that we do not include the information
on the lagged response here, that is implicitly included in the STERGM mechanics.
XXI
Number Model Name lagged edge covariates rand. eff. PR % ROC %
1 Autoreg. ERGM yes no no 0 0
2 TERGM no yes no 0 0
3 TERGM no yes yes 0 1.54%
4 TERGM with dyadic stability yes yes no 4.62% 6.15%
5 TERGM with dyadic stability yes yes yes 18.46% 44.62%
6 STERGM implicit yes no 24.62% 6.15%
7 STERGM implicit yes yes 52.31% 41.54%
Table 4: Different dynamic network models from the ERGM family included in the com-
parison of prediction. Name of the models in the second column. Model specification in
columns three, four and five. The share of years where the respective model performed best
according to the AUC of the PR or the ROC curve are given in the two rightmost columns.
TERGM with covariates and dyadic stability (Model 4): The inclusion of the lagged response
to the TERGM with covariates gives
log
{
P (Y t,t−1ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
P (Y t,t−1ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
}
= θg˜ij(y
t−1,t, xt−1,t) + θ1y
t−1,t
ij . (7)
TERGM with network effects, dyadic stability and random effects (Model 5): And as a last
step we allow for sender- and receiver-specific random effects in the TERGM with network
statistics and lagged response:
log
{
P (Y t,t−1ij = 1|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
P (Y t,t−1ij = 0|Y t−1,t = yt−1,t, X t−1,t = xt−1,t; θ)
}
=θg˜ij(y
t−1,t, xt−1,t) + θ1y
t−1,t
ij
+ φi,sender(t) + φj,receiver(t).
(8)
STERGM without random effects (Model 6): Together with our main model from the paper
(Model 7), the STERGM with random effects we additionally include a STERGM without
random effects. The formal representations are given in the main paper in equations (4) and
(5).
B.4.3. Comparison of out-of-sample predictions
We evaluate the proposed models in the following way. In a first step, we fit coefficients
based on the information of t− 1 to the response in t. In the second step we use the fitted
models in order to predict the edges in t + 1. As a result we obtain probabilistic out-of-
sample predictions. The evaluation is done with area under the curve (AUC) measures for
the Receiver-Operating-Characteristic (ROC) curve and the Precision-Recall (PR) curve.
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Figure 19: AUC values for out-of-sample predictions based on precision recall (left) and
receiver-operator-characteristics (right). The STERGM with covariates and random effects
(Model 7) in solid and red, the autoregressive ERGM (Model 1) and the TERGM with
covariates (Model 2) and random effects (Model 3) in black and dashed.
All models are fitted using the package mgcv (Wood 2017; Version 1.8-24) and evaluated
with the package PRROC (Grau et al. 2015; Version 1.3).
Table 4 gives and overview of the predictive performance of all models included. In the
two rightmost columns we present the share of years where the respective model has the high-
est out-of-sample predictive power. It can be seen that evaluated by the PR, the STERGM
with random effects clearly represents the superior model with the highest predictive perfor-
mance. Judged by the ROC the performance of the TERGM and the STERGM (both with
random effects and as a model class) are very similar. We give a detailed description of the
results below.
In order to give a clear impression of how the out-of-sample fits are related we provide
multiple plots where the baseline model, the STERGM with covariates and random effects,
is always indicated in solid red.
In Figure 19 we compare the AUC values of the autoregressive ERGM (Model 1), the
TERGM with covariates (Model 2) and with random effects (Model 3) with the baseline
STERGM model (Model 7). The Precision Recall AUC values are shown on the left hand
side of Figure 19 and provide a clear message since all selected candidate models have AUC
values clearly below the STERGM used in the paper (Model 7). Looking at the AUC values
from the ROC measure (right panel) shows that the two TERGM models (Models 2 and
3) come partly close to the baseline model in the first years of the observational period,
while the simplistic autoregressive ERGM has considerable lower AUC values. However as
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Figure 20: AUC Values for out-of-sample predictions based on precision recall (left) and
receiver-operator-characteristics (right). The STERGM with covariates and random effects
(Model 7) in solid and red, the TERGM with covariates, dyadic stability (Model 4) and
random effects (Model 5) in black and dashed.
a general picture the STERGM with random effects is clearly the superior model.
Including the lagged response as explanatory variable makes the TERGM models (Models
4 and 5) pretty similar to our baseline model (Model 7). Naturally, this is reflected in Figure
20. However, the STERGM model is more flexible because it allows for different coefficients
for the processes of formation and persistence. This fact leads to superior predictions of
the STERGM model (Model 7) in the left panel of Figure 20. The red line provides the
upper boundary in most time points, but there are some instances where the autoregressive
TERGMs (Models 4 and 5) provide the better predictions when evaluated with the PR curve.
If the AUC measure for the ROC curve is compared, we see again that the predictions of
the TERGM partly outperform the STERGM. Nevertheless, this is mostly the case in the
beginning of the observational period and it seems like the superiority of the STERGM
increases with the more recent periods.
In Figure 21 the predictive performance of the STERGM with (Model 7) and without
(Model 6) random effects is compared. Although the AUC values are very close to each other,
the model that includes the random effects clearly provides better out-of-sample predictions.
On the right hand side of Figure 21 the contrast becomes visible more clearly and in almost
all years our baseline model provides the better predictions.
All in all we conclude the following. (i) The STERGM gives, among all other candidate
models the best predictions when judged by Precision Recall, being the more important
measure when predicting rare vents. (ii) Furthermore, the STERGM has a much richer
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Figure 21: AUC values for out-of-sample predictions based on precision recall (left) and
receiver-operator-characteristics (right). The STERGM with covariates and random effects
(Model 7) in solid and red, the STERGM with covariates but without random effects (Model
6) in black and dashed.
interpretation than the TERGM and (iii) the random effects provide an substantial benefit
to the inferential part of the model. We therefore conclude that the choice of the STERGM
with random effects seems to be very appropriate regarding both, the predictive performance
as well as the ability to gain new insights.
XXV
